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New World Order or recipe 
for disorder? 
The press have made much of President Bush's rhetorical claim for a new world order 
in the aftermath ofthe UN-sanctioned and US-led war against Iraq. The reality of a 
new world order is likely to be quite different to the popular view of a resurgent UN 
wielding the sword of the US military and triumphing over evil. 
In reality the central issue in the new world order is about how to fill the power 
vacuum left by the collapse of the USSR. It is clear that the US will be unable and 
unwilling to fill that vacuum by itself. Nor is the current UN capable of doing so. 
The Iraq war has not brought about a major change in international power 
relationships. Instead it is an example of some of the opportunities and limitations 
inherent in the. power vacuum resulting from the economic and political failures in 
the USSR. 
Without the major withdrawal of Soviet international influence, the events in the 
Middle East would have been quite different. It is likely that the USSR would have 
stopped Iraq's military annexation of Kuwait before it even started. Certainly the 
aftermath would have been different. In the days of a strong and influential USSR 
there would have been vigorous support for its client state both in the UN and 
outside which would have stymied the US progress towards war with Iraq. As an oil, 
exporter the USSR had a common economic interest with Iraq in limiting Kuwait's 
price depressing over production of oil. 
The limitations of the new world order as demonstrated by the Iraq war are 
principally economic. The US was unable to pay for the war and required very high 
levels of economic and military support from its allies. The success in Iraq was 
crucially dependent on $US 50 billion of Arab, German and Japanese money. 
It is likely that in a future conflict the US would find it far more difficult to 
obtain such enormous financial underwriting from abroad. The political cost of this 
dependency will become apparent in future US relations with these countries. The 
US economy is simply unable to support the gigantic cost of war. The cost of 
weapons in peace has already bankrupted the US budget. The cost in war is far 
greater. Economics precludes the US from expanding into the vacuum left by the 
USSR in the way it was able to do immediately after the Second World War. Kennedy 
(1989) provides an excellent exposition of the importance of economic strength in 
determining which nations became great powers. 
The economic failure of the UK after the Second World War is a good example 
of the process. The UK went from being a central part of the Big Three summits 
which began at Tehran in 1941 to its exclusion from the Soviet-US summit at 
Vienna in 1961. This is despite the retention of a very powerful military. The UK 
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was able to handle the Kuwait crisis of 1961 using only their military and kept Iraq 
on its side of the border. But that military power was not backed by economic power. 
Even more dramatically, economic failure has eaten away at the material basis of 
the USSR's great power status. The economic cost of the USSR's troops, stock of 
weapons and military research has crippledits ability to meet its citizens' expectations 
for improvements in their standard of living. The weakness of the USSR's economic 
base also shows up in the quality of their weapons which appeared out classed in the 
Iraq war. 
The fundamental weakness of the USSR economy and the inability of the US 
economy to sustain a military expansion into the resulting vacuum leaves a space for 
other countries exert their own interests. The lessening of the Soviet threat will most 
strongly impact on Germany and Japan. Both these countries have been crucially 
dependent on US military power for protection against possible USSR attack. This 
has limited their ability to aggressively pursue their own interests where they conflict 
with the US. In the past, the main area of such conflict has been over trade issues and 
this can be expected to intensify. 
Germany has already reacted to the power vacuum by absorbing East Germany. 
This has caused some immediate financial and employment problems but will greatly 
increase Germany's economic strength over the next few years. Germany is likely to 
continue with a strategy of expanding its European economic dominance both 
through the strengthening of the EEC and bilaterally in Eastern Europe. 
The construction of a single European market which is far larger than the US 
will exacerbate tensions about trade access for US exporters. The unwillingness of the 
Europeans to compromise on agricultural protectionism in the GATT negotiations is 
an example of the growing European independence from the US. 
In the past the US has allowed the Japanese significant economic concessions in 
order to build it up as a bastion against communism. When he was Prime Minister, 
Yasuhiro Nakasome called Japan an "unsinkable aircraft carrier". This aircraft carrier 
is no longer as useful to the US. The reduced Soviet threat has encouraged the US to 
qe more demanding of economic concessions from Japan. 
Japan, with its relatively modest military budget, is heavily dependent on US 
military protection. The trade conflicts between Japan and the US are running hot. 
The US is using its political muscle to force Japanese trade and domestic economic 
concessions: concessions which the US believes will bolster its poor economic 
performance. The weakening of the Soviet threat reduces Japan's military 
dependence and will strengthen its ability to resist these US demands. 
In this way the withdrawal of the USSR has encouraged both Japan and the US 
to be more demanding of their economic relationship. This is exacerbating the 
existing economic conflict over closed Japanese markets and Japan's desire to play a 
larger international role. Most recently Japan has clashed with the US over US 
initiatives to forgive Polish and Egyptian debts and over the Japanese proposal for the 
International Monetary Fund to create more international money. These are both 
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areas where Japan traditionally follows the US line and certainly not areas of public 
disagreement. 
The USSR's power vacuum is likely to be filled by an unstable triumvirate of 
economically strong Europe and Japan and a militarily strong US. Trade conflicts can 
be expected to grow between the three groups particularly as the North American 
and European trade blocs expand. Such conflicts will stop well short of military 
options due to the willingness of the public to accept the enormous economic costs 
involved. 
The limitations of a new world order are also apparent in the developing world. 
The cost of the Iraq war makes it unlikely that the US or the allies together would 
contemplate another military adventure in a large developing country. However the 
military option may still be affordable in small poor countries like Grenada and 
Panama. But, even small countries like Mghanistan and Nicaragua have shown that 
with the will to resist military adventures by the major powers can be made 
prohibitively expensive. 
Direct military intervention in developing countries by the great powers has 
gradually become less and less common and the new world order will not alter that. 
However, the new world order will remove much of the cold war rivalry from the 
developing countries' internal and external conflicts. Such conflicts should be less 
well-funded, less ideological, hopefully less violent and more transparently tied to 
local interests. After years of being propped up alternatively by the US and USSR, 
long time dictators in Ethiopia and Somalia have fled their countries. Unfortunately 
the damage they caused will take many years to repair. Elsewhere dictators and single 
party states are finding it opportune to encourage more democratic government if 
they wish to retain the external support they enjoyed as cold war surrogates. 
The limitations of the power vacuum brought about by the economic failure of 
the USSR will quicken the rise of Europe, Japan and to a lesser extent the developing 
world as a counterweight to a faltering US power in international relations. There is 
likely to be considerable instability as this largely tripartite great power relationship 
develops. Even when the relationship matures it is likely to be inherently unstable as 
there is a tendency for two of the powers to combine against the third. The declining 
nature of US power will also introduce instability, as its objective will overreach its 
abilities. However, the conflict should be confined to economic warfare because 
military warfare could not be afforded. 
There are opportunities in the decline of Soviet international influence. These lie 
most particularly in a reduction in the cold war tensions. Opportunities include a 
transfer of resources away from the military towards more productive uses, a more 
rational system of bilateral international relations built on common interest rather 
than ideology and the better operation of multilateral relations, particularly in the 
United Nations. 
The 'peace dividend' from the end of the cold war and accelerated disarmament 
talks have been overrated. Both the Soviet and US government budgets are in a poor 
state and any savings in military expenditure will be absorbed in reducing budget 
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deficits before they are applied to expanding foreign assistance. However a longer 
term reduction in military spending and strengthening of 
government budgets may encourage economic growth and make more resources 
available for socially useful purposes such as aid flows. 
Bilateral relations have been disrupted by the fall in Soviet power. The Soviet 
client states in Eastern Europe have broken free from the most odious aspects of 
Soviet domination but have also lost Soviet support such as cheap oil and guaranteed 
export markets. Their search for new bilateral partners is already strongly directed at 
Western Europe. Market access, financial assistance and refugees will strain the 
relationship between Eastern and Western European countries for some time. 
However the multilateral institution of the EEC makes it possible to share the 
burdens of support and can over time integrate Eastern Europe into the European 
economy. 
In the developing world, Soviet client states are experiencing large reductions in 
support from the USSR and Eastern Europe without offsetting increases in other aid. 
This is a growing problem in Indo-china, Cuba and Southern African. The gradual 
winding down of the cold war has also seen a fall in America aid to the developing 
world, as competition for developing country allegiances wains. To an extent this has 
been offset by expanded aid from the economic power-houses of]apan and Europe. 
The freeing of bilateral relations from their cold war straightjacket has opened up 
possibilities for more rational bilateral cooperation. This can be along issue lines such 
as the Cairns Group which is promoting freer trade in agricultural products and 
crosses the old ideological bounds by including North/South and East/West 
members such as Australia and Argentina, and Canada and Hungary. 
More rational bilateral cooperation can also be along regional lines. An example 
is the People's Republic of China which formerly found that balancing the Soviet and 
American superpowers off against one another was in China's security interests. With 
that balance removed, China is undertaking a diplomatic offensive to strengthen its 
regional ties. Bilateral problems with the US such as the current determination in the 
US Congress to exclude China from trade concessions must now be fought on their 
merits rather than in a cold war context. In this new contest, China needs all the 
support from its neighbours that it can get. 
Through out the developing world regional trade initiatives are multiplying and 
strengthening. Examples are the Eastern and Southern African Preferential Trade 
Area, the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation initiative, the Arab Maghreb Union, 
the African Common Market initiative, the Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay 
free trade initiative, and the Andean Pact, among others. This impetuous toward 
regional cooperation is not new but without the constrictions of the cold war should 
be more successful than in previous periods. 
Multilateral organisations such as the UN were fundamentally weakened by their 
use as an ideological battle ground during the cold war period. In contrast, the World 
Bank and the. International Monetary Fund, which avoided cold war tensions by 
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excluding the USSR and most other communist countries, prospered and now 
dominate multilateral development assistance. 
In the UN, the dramatic reduction in cold war tensions and the expansion of 
cooperation which was demonstrated during the Iraq war, have opened up a real 
opportunity for the UN to take up a much more substantial role in international 
relations. This can be seen as a return to the UN's early days when US dominance 
used the UN as legitimating agency for decisions that were made outside the UN. 
The parallel here between the US led and UN sanctioned wars in Korea and Iraq are 
very strong. However, the caricature of the UN as a US puppet is too simplistic. 
The US success in Iraq depended crucially on the support of a disparate group of 
allies. Keeping them together require and important place for the UN. Popular 
opinion in the allied countries also depended on the war being painted as a just UN-
sanctioned war. In future if the US wishes to obtain international support for its 
military adventures it will need to go back to the UN. This is an impetuous to the US 
to play a more supportive role in the UN than has been the case in the 1980s. This 
will be made easier because many of the 1980s objectives of the US have been 
achieved such as reduced use of majority voting and UN staff and budget cuts. 
Unfortunately during the period of its irrelevancy, the UN has evolved into a 
wasteful and complex talk shop. It is organisationally ill-suited to the role it is now 
being expected to take up. Reform of the UN will be a precondition for a more 
substantive role. Fortunately the UN and others have made practical suggestions to 
improve the working of the UN (Urquhart and Childers, 1990: ODI, 1987: Nordic 
UNProject, Schrijver, 1988). The major issues include strengthening the role of the 
Secretary-General, reducing overlap and improved coordination between agencies, 
amalgamating agencies, simplifYing unwieldy governing bodies and a more focused 
agenda. While reforms are difficult in such a comprehensive forum, with improved 
relations they are possible. 
The Iraq war has not brought about a new world order. This is due to the 
collapse of the USSR as a world power. The new world order will be about how we 
adapt as a global economy and polity to fill the vacuum this has created. This 
adaption can be handled badly. The civil strife in Somalia and the growing conflict in 
Yugoslavia are pointers to what will happen if we handle the politics of this vacuum 
badly. In the economic sphere the exacerbation of trade tensions and the growth of 
trading blocs point to the destructive trade wars of the 1930s. 
No single country, not even the US, can fill the vacuum on its own. The 
unstable triumvirate of America, Japan and Germany is a worrying reversal of the 
1930s where an economically strong but militarily weak US faced militarily strong 
but economically flawed Japan and Germany. The current triangular relationship 
seems destined to exacerbate conflicts. 
On the positive side, the rest of the global polity and economy can have a 
stabilising influence on these major powers. The UN provides a forum which can be 
strengthened and reformed to fill the vacuum which has been left by the end of the 
cold war. It is very much in the interests of middle powers like Australia to play a 
prominent role in the revitalisation of the UN. 
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